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INTRODUCTION
The Thirteenth Amendment currently enjoys a robust renaissance
among legal scholars who contend that it provides a judicial remedy for
and congressional authority to proscribe the “badges and incidents of
slavery.”1 As discussed below, this interpretation, although not selfevident from the Amendment’s bare text, is well supported by the
Amendment’s history and context, the Framers’ explicit intentions, the
legislative debates in Congress leading to the Amendment’s adoption,
*

Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers spoke extensively of eliminating the “badges” of
slavery and the “incidents” of slavery. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and
Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 570–78 (2012). The unitary phrase “badges and
incidents of slavery” is generally traced to the Civil Rights Cases. 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (stating that
the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to “pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing
all badges and incidents of slavery”).
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and the contemporaneous legal understanding of the ways in which the
Slave Power that had come to dominate and distort American society.
This Article briefly explores whether the Thirteenth Amendment
applies to class-based subordination and concludes that it generally does
not, at least not in such broad terms. The Amendment’s text, history,
context, and intent do not support an interpretation of the Amendment as
generally prohibiting discrimination or subordination based on social
class distinctions per se that are completely detached from the legacy of
chattel slavery or involuntary servitude. Rather, this Article argues, it is
only when class-based distinctions are so impermeable and of such magnitude as to transform class into caste, thus constituting a near-total alienation from civil society akin to that characteristic of the system of
slavery, that the Thirteenth Amendment would apply.
To be clear from the outset: in arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment does not reach generalized class-based subordination, this Article
does not contend that these issues are unimportant. To the contrary, the
increasingly rigid class-based stratification of our society,2 rampant discrimination against the poor,3 increasing income inequality,4 and the
concentration of enormous wealth in the hands of so few5 are pressing
social challenges that must be addressed, and the legal system has a role
in addressing these challenges. This Article argues, however, that the
Thirteenth Amendment is not the most appropriate tool to address these
2. See, e.g., PABLO A. MITNIK & DAVID B. GRUSKY, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS & RUSSELL
SAGE FOUND., ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2015), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/07/economicmobilityintheunitedstates.pdf?la=en;
Bernice Lott, The Social Psychology of Class and Classism, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 650, 650
(2012); Michael Hout, How Class Works in Popular Conception: Most Americans Identify with the
Class Their Income, Occupation, and Education Implies for Them 3 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Survey
Research
Ctr.,
2007),
available
at
http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/rsfcensus/papers/HoutClassIDJan07.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Heather Bullock, Justifying Inequality: A Social Psychological Analysis of Beliefs
About Poverty and the Poor 2 (Nat’l Poverty Ctr., Working Paper No. 06-08, 2006), available at
http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/workingpaper06/paper08/working_paper06-08.pdf;
Discrimination, Inequality, and Poverty—A Human Rights Perspective, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan.
11, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/11/discrimination-inequality-and-poverty-humanrights-perspective.
4. Jonathan Fisher, Jeffrey Thompson & Timothy Smeeding, Income Inequality, PATHWAYS,
Special
Issue
2015,
at
22,
22,
available
at
https://web.stanford.edu/group/scspi/sotu/SOTU_2015.pdf; Janet C. Gornick & Branko Milanovic,
Income Inequality in the United States in Cross-National Perspective: Redistribution Revisited 3
(Lux. Income Study Ctr., 2015), available at https://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/CUNYGraduate-Center/PDF/Centers/LIS/LIS-Center-Research-Brief-1-2015.pdf; MARK MATHER & BETH
JAROSZ, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, POPULATION BULLETIN: THE DEMOGRAPHY OF
INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2014), available at http://www.prb.org/pdf14/united-statesinequality.pdf.
5. See, e.g., CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014, at 8 (2015).
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challenges because subordination or discrimination based on class or
poverty does not, at a generalized level, amount to a badge or incident of
slavery. Moreover, the Thirteenth Amendment’s intent, context, and history make clear that its Framers were concerned with specific forms of
class-based subordination connected with or arising out of the system of
slavery: examples of such subordination include the de jure or de facto
economic subjugation of laborers via the extraction of their uncompensated labor through state or private action, the creation of conditions that
effectively prohibited laborers’ free choice of their employer and working conditions, and the maintenance of a labor system wherein the compensation and conditions of certain groups of workers were artificially
suppressed through the exploitation of an even less empowered group of
workers (i.e., slaves). In sum, this Article’s skepticism regarding whether
the Thirteenth Amendment can be fairly construed to prohibit classbased subordination is limited to class-based subordination in its broadest form, not in its particulars.
Regardless of whether the Thirteenth Amendment could be fairly
construed to prohibit class-based subordination in general (which this
Article argues against) or in the particulars (which very well may be the
case, as discussed above), there is currently very little reason to believe
that the Amendment will be so construed by the courts and policymakers
charged with interpreting and enforcing it. As discussed in Part II.C, infra, there are significant reasons to be highly skeptical that the doctrinal
groundwork has yet been laid for such a theory of the Thirteenth
Amendment to take root; the federal courts (in particular, the Supreme
Court) are therefore exceedingly unlikely to extend current doctrine in a
single leap in order to incorporate such a theory.
After describing a defensible theoretical frame for when the Thirteenth Amendment’s command to rid the country of the vestiges of the
slave system applies to class-based subordination, this Article concludes
by briefly sketching the outline of one such scenario: the insurmountable
caste system created by mass incarceration. This caste system is created
by the interlocking and mutually reinforcing effects of mass incarceration, such as felony disenfranchisement, barriers to employment, and
widespread reincarceration due to inability to pay fines. These effects
result in the near-complete alienation of former prisoners (particularly
persons of color) from civil society.
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I. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT’S CURRENT SCOPE AND
APPLICABILITY
A. The Thirteenth Amendment’s History and Context
The Thirteenth Amendment was the culmination of a decades-long
campaign by social movement and political actors to abolish slavery in
the United States.6 It was also in significant part a reaction to the specific
cultural, legal, political, and economic structures that supported slavery
or developed because of it. Understanding the Thirteenth Amendment
therefore requires understanding the system of slavery the Amendment
was designed to abolish and the forces its Framers were reacting against.
Although a comprehensive examination of the nature of slavery and abolition is obviously beyond the scope of this Article, it is nonetheless
worthwhile to review briefly the contemporaneous context in which the
Amendment was adopted with an eye toward discerning the legal, historical, and social structures it was designed to abolish along with abolishing slavery itself.
Initially, slavery in the “new world” colonies followed the
then-prevalent model of time-limited indentures or uncompensated labor
for a finite (albeit often very lengthy) term of years.7 As American slavery evolved in response to changing social and economic needs,8 however, it became a system of perpetual, inheritable, race-based subjugation,
under which the slaves were treated as property, and all blacks, even if
free, were subject to the same stigmatization. The American slave regime, which existed as a matter of law for approximately 250 years,9
6. See Alexander Tsesis, Introduction: The Thirteenth Amendment’s Revolutionary Aims, in
THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT 6–12 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010) (tracing the history of abolitionism and its influence
upon the Thirteenth Amendment); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848, at 15–16 (1977) (same).
7. Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, in THE LEGAL
UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY 105, 107 (Jean Allain ed., 2012) (“The first Africans in Virginia were
treated as indentured servants, held for a term of years, and then eligible for freedom.”).
8. See generally id. (describing the evolution of African slavery in the United States and how
the laws and norms governing slavery changed in response to differing social and economic imperatives over time, for example: increasing slave populations in Southern states that were argued to
justify more brutal control over the slaves, the greater fear of domestic slave rebellions as slave
populations increased, the examples of successful slave rebellions abroad (as in Haiti), increasing
dependence of southern economies upon slave labor and the concomitant fear that those economies
would collapse without slave labor, and rising abolitionist sentiment over time in the North in favor
of immediate emancipation rather than the gradualism that had previously prevailed).
9. The American institution of legalized chattel slavery is generally dated as beginning in 1619
with the sale of twenty enslaved Africans to British colonialists in North America. See A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE
COLONIAL PERIOD 20 (1978) (discussing the legal status of blacks in 1619 Jamestown). It is worth
remembering that the history of legal enslavement has to date lasted a full century longer than the
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both depended upon and gave rise to several mutually reinforcing legal,
social, political, religious, and economic justifications and conditions. As
is well known, the legal system formally legitimized the institution of
slavery by defining slaves as “property” and by protecting the interests of
slave owners in that property.10 The legal system also further dehumanized blacks in a myriad of other ways, denying them the civil rights to
which they would presumably be entitled were they considered to be full
human beings and citizens of the United States.11 Such denial of legal
rights and civil status to both slaves and free blacks initially served primarily instrumental purposes, including: giving the owner the legal right
to profit from the slave’s labor without providing compensation; permitting and immunizing from prosecution or civil recourse the violence and
coercion necessary to compel such labor; granting the master the legal
right to purchase, lease, leverage, and dispose of slaves (and their children) without even the rudimentary labor protections afforded to nonslaves at the time; and, as with other chattel, giving the owner the legal
right to dispose of it when its utility had ended.12
As slavery became fully entrenched, several factors became perceived as real threats to the economic and social order of the slaveholding South. Those factors included the growing black populations in
slaveholding states, the concomitant fear of slave rebellions, and the abolitionist movement— which was tentative at first, then expressed with
increasing vigor and virulence. Slavery thus became an ideological battle, and law and custom evolved in defense of slavery. Thus, while the
panoply of laws and customs discussed above continued to serve their
original instrumental purposes, they also served the expressive purpose
of dehumanizing slaves (and by extension, all blacks) as completely un-

history of freedom from bondage (i.e., 1619 to the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1865,
versus 1865 to the present day).
10. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 646 (1842) (holding that the Fugitive Slave Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce constitutional rights—
specifically, “property” rights of slave owners to recapture escaped slaves).
11. For example, slaves (and free blacks in most states) were denied “the rights to enforce
contracts, sue, give evidence in court, inherit, and purchase, lease, hold, and convey real property.”
ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 45 (2004) (citing
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer)). They were also denied parental and familial rights, deprived of personal liberty, and denied the ability to receive an
education. See William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1324, nn.33–34 (2007) and accompanying text.
12. See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (1982) (describing the instrumental features of the American slave system).
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deserving of either civil rights or moral empathy.13 This expressive function was important in relieving the tension always inherent in American
slavery, that “a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to equal rights
happened also to be the nation, by the mid-nineteenth century, with the
largest number of slaves in the Western Hemisphere.”14 Such potential
social dissonance was lessened by the “othering” and dehumanization of
the enslaved. If slaves (and as a corollary, all blacks) were presumed to
be less than fully human, then a fortiori they were not entitled to the natural rights and freedoms—including freedom from bondage—that all
human beings were presumed to possess. In sum, “the system of slavery
depended not only upon the coercive power to deny freedom and equality to blacks but also to a significant degree upon the expressive power of
law and custom to deny the validity of the idea of black freedom and
equality.”15
In addition to reconciling the ideal of liberty for all with the reality
of the brutal enslavement of some, the American legal system abetted the
system of slavery in numerous specific ways. The law provided a matrix
of slavery-supporting structures by, for example, criminalizing certain
conduct only when engaged in by blacks;16 permitting warrantless
searches, seizures, and arrests without cause or on the merest pretext;17
13. Thus, “any judicial protection of the slave would trigger further challenges to the legitimacy of the dehumanized status of blacks and slaves” because viewing slaves as rights-holders would
erode the view that they were less than full human beings. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., supra note 9, at 8.
14. David Brion Davis, Foreword: The Rocky Road to Freedom—Crucial Barriers to Abolition
in the Antebellum Years, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY
RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT xi, xvi (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010).
15. William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment and Pro-Equality Speech, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 1855, 1859 (2012).
16. Under the Slave Codes, the defendant’s race was explicitly stated as a determinative element of various crimes. In Virginia, for example, “[s]laves could receive the death penalty for at
least sixty-eight offenses, whereas for whites the same conduct was either at most punishable by
imprisonment or was not a crime at all.” A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law
Only as an Enemy”: The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 977 (1992). Notably, the pervasive conflation
of blackness with a presumption of criminality also had the corollary effect of placing whites in
constant fear of blacks, thereby making whites more willing to accept black subjugation in the name
of white safety. William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial
Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 68–69 (2004) (“Th[e] myth of innate black immorality
and criminality significantly aided the dehumanization of African Americans in the collective white
mind. If all blacks were innate savages, not only were they less than human and therefore fit to be
enslaved, but white guilt was also lessened by appealing to white fear as a justification for black
enslavement.”); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
NEGRO, 1550–1812, at 109–10 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1977) (1968) (noting that the preamble to the
South Carolina Slave Code specifically sought to justify the slave code as necessary to “tend[ing] to
the safety and security of the [white] people of this Province and their estates.”).
17. See Carter, supra note 16, at 64 and authorities cited therein (discussing slave code provisions and law enforcement practices authorizing race-based searches, seizures, and arrests without
individual suspicion and without judicial process).
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restricting freedom of movement through, inter alia, requiring that slaves
have and display a pass from the master when unaccompanied by a white
person;18 prohibiting the education of slaves;19 prohibiting civil marriages;20 prohibiting slaves (and in many states, free blacks) from owning
property or forming binding contracts;21 and, of course, denying the fundamental rights of citizenship, including the rights to vote, to due process, to free speech, and to be judged by a jury of one’s peers.22
The Framers designed the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate this
racial caste-based alienation from civil society and also to eliminate the
supporting laws and customs enforcing it.23 These laws and customs
were not merely instances of unequal treatment imposed solely through
the ill intent of discrete actors. Rather, the “Slave Power,” as it became
known, was understood to be systemic and deeply interwoven into the
fabric of American society.24 Slavery, under this view, had become “the
master of the Government and the people”;25 conversely, then, the “death

18. See id. at 63 and authorities cited therein (describing the pass requirements of various slave
codes).
19. See WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE
AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS
STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 319–23 (Negro Univ. Press 1968)
(1853) (surveying the various legal penalties for violating laws prohibiting educating slaves).
20. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 182 (De St. Romes 1825). See generally Darlene C. Goring,
The History of Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299 (2006).
21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1018 (Brittan and DeWolf 1852); LA. CIV. CODE art. 174 (De St.
Romes 1825).
22. For examples of provisions limiting voting to white males at least 21 years of age, see, for
example, MD. CONST. of 1776, art. II; N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. VII, VIII; VA. CONST. of 1830, art.
III, § 14. See also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 316–20 (rev. ed. 2000). For an example of free speech limitations, see GA. CODE ch. XXXIV, art. 16 (Trow 1845) (restricting persons of color from preaching or
exhorting without a license). With regard to jury trial rights, see, for example, GA. CODE ch.
XXXIV, art. 27 (Trow 1845); TENN. CODE pt. III, tit. 4, ch. 5, art. II, § 4002 and pt. II, tit. 5, ch. 3,
art. IV, § 2633 (Eastman 1858) (limiting jury service to whites).
23. For example, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, one of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
most forceful advocates in Congress, argued during the Thirteenth Amendment debates that the
Amendment was designed to “obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing [sic], degrading, and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit; all it was and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to it.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199, 1319, 1321,
1324 (1864).
24. “The idea of a southern ‘Slave Power’ that dominated national politics . . . emerged in the
1830’s and became part of the nation’s political discourse in the years leading up to the Civil War.”
Sandra L. Rierson, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution, 35 VT. L. REV. 765, 801
(2011). Indeed, Senator (and later Vice President) Henry Wilson’s three-volume treatise surveying
slavery and slavery’s destruction was entitled the “History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in
America.” See HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA
(Samuel Hunt ed., 1872).
25. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199, 1323 (1864) (statement of Sen. Wilson of Massachusetts).
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of slavery [would be] the life of the Nation.”26 By the 1850s, what had
been clear to the enslaved since the Founding had finally become clear to
both the mainstream and more radical Republicans: that the Constitution’s compromise with slavery had failed. These Republicans became
the driving force behind the Thirteenth Amendment. The series of political and constitutional crises27 that accelerated the path to war revealed in
stark relief that the still-young nation could not endure “permanently half
slave and half free. . . . It [would] become all one thing, or all the other.”28 The Thirteenth Amendment constitutionalized the practical end
result of the Civil War: that the Slave Power would no longer rule the
nation; that the maintenance of a permanent racial caste system would no
longer be abetted or condoned by law; and that the badges and incidents
of slavery would be abolished along with slavery itself.
B. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers and Their Understanding of the
Relationship Between Slavery, Race, and “Class”
The Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers expressed little explicit concern during the framing debates regarding class qua class. This is unsurprising for several reasons. First, our contemporary language regarding
“class” had not at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment debates truly
entered the American jurisprudential, philosophical, ideological, or lay
lexicons.29 Second, the urgent issue was slavery and the consequences
thereof, not social class in the way we think of it today.30 Third, the incidents of slavery that the Framers did discuss and that do relate to what
we conceive of today as class issues were generally discussed as consequences of slavery rather than as independent targets of the Thirteenth
Amendment. For example, the depression of working-class whites’ wages due to competing unpaid slave labor was discussed at some length in
the framing debates as one of the many damaging consequences of the
Slave Power; but it was slavery itself, rather than the low wages availa-

26. Id. at 1319.
27. See William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment and Constitutional Change, 38
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 583, 585 nn.6–7 (2014) (describing how the Kansas-Nebraska
dispute regarding extension of slavery into the frontier territories and the Supreme Court’s decision
in Dred Scott sharpened the divisions that ultimately led to war).
28. Abraham Lincoln, Address at the Republican State Convention (June 16, 1898), in 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasis in original).
29. See, e.g., SOCIAL CLASS AND STRATIFICATION: CLASSIC STATEMENTS AND THEORETICAL
DEBATES 2, 4 (Rhonda F. Levine ed., 1998); DENNIS GILBERT & JOSEPH A. KAHL, THE AMERICAN
CLASS STRUCTURE 4, 8 (3d ed. 1987).
30. Indeed, slavery and its consequences, in the minds of the Framers and many members of
the public on both sides of the debate, was an existential issue for the survival of the Nation.
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ble to nonslave laborers, that was viewed as the condition to be addressed by the Thirteenth Amendment.31
Although the framing debates do not directly address class issues,
they do, however, reveal an understanding of slavery as a system that
permanently demarcated social class by race. The Framers conceptualized slavery as establishing a racial caste system for both slaves and free
blacks. Justice Harlan provided the most familiar (albeit retrospective)
recitation of the Framers’ views in this regard in his Plessy v. Ferguson32
dissent:
[I]n view of the [C]onstitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our [C]onstitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.
....
It was adjudged in [Dred Scott] that the descendants of Africans
who were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, were not
included nor intended to be included under the word ‘citizens’ in the
[C]onstitution . . . and, whether emancipated or not . . . had no rights
or privileges but such as those who held the power and the government might choose to grant them. The recent amendments of the
[C]onstitution, it was supposed, had eradicated these principles
from our institutions. But it seems that we have yet, in some of the
states, a dominant race,-a superior class of citizens,-which assumes
to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race.33

31. For example, Representative Ingersoll of Illinois stated during the Thirteenth Amendment
debates that the Amendment would apply to “the seven millions of poor white people who live in the
slave States but who have ever been deprived of the blessings of manhood by reason of . . . slavery,”
presumably by virtue of the unpaid labor pool that slavery provided, which drove down the wages of
the white laboring class and made labor seem dishonorable. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
2989, 2990 (1864). Similarly, Representative Wilson of Iowa argued during the debates that “the
poor white man” had been “impoverished, debased, dishonored by the system that makes toil a
badge of disgrace.” See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 (1995) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864)). Moreover, some
early judicial decisions construing the Thirteenth Amendment interpreted it as applying beyond the
freedmen, at least in principle. See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky.
1866) (No. 16,151), cited in Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 901 (1986) (stating, in finding the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 to be constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, that the Amendment
“throws its protection over every one, of every race, color, and condition”).
32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33. Id. at 559–60 (citation omitted).
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Justice Harlan’s dissent may be of somewhat limited value as an exercise
in pure history in discerning how the Framers actually viewed issues of
class through the prism of the Thirteenth Amendment. Among other reasons, his dissent was not written contemporaneously with the framing
experience and therefore may suffer from both presentism and inaccuracy; moreover, it was, like much historical information that is cited in the
context of litigation, history deployed for instrumental purposes rather
than history qua history. As a jurisprudential matter, however, Justice
Harlan’s summary of the Framers’ views of slavery as creating a racebased caste system can be a useful starting point for Thirteenth Amendment interpretation. Reviewing the original source material (i.e., the
Thirteenth Amendment debates) reveals that Justice Harlan’s account of
this issue is consistent with the views the Framers expressed.34 It is also
consistent with the actual American experience of slavery. For example,
if slavery were separable from notions of permanence and impermeability characterizing racial caste norms, then one would expect that the legal
disabilities, discrimination, and stigmatization associated therewith
would have been limited to those blacks who were actually enslaved.
Former slaves and the free black descendants of slaves would not have
been subjected to the same legal and social subordination as slaves if
slavery were merely about servitude, as opposed to being equally about
racial caste and white supremacy. As a simple example, the “one-drop
rule”35 would have made little sense were it not for the racial caste conception of slavery: a racial caste is (conceptually) something that is inheritable via lineal descent; a labor status is not.
C. The Thirteenth Amendment as Applied by the Courts and Congress
Notwithstanding the history and context described in Sections A
and B, supra, the Thirteenth Amendment’s full potential scope remains
under-realized. The Amendment’s goal of empowering the federal government to proscribe and remediate the vestiges of slavery has not been
matched by the scope of its application in the courts and in Congress. In
the area of racial discrimination, Congress has not since the Reconstruction era relied upon the Thirteenth Amendment to enact civil rights legis34. For example, Senator Henderson of Missouri stated, “I will not be intimidated by the fears
of negro equality. The negro may possess mental qualities entitling him to a position beyond our
present belief. If so, I shall put no obstacle in the way of his elevation. There is nothing in me that
despises merit or envies its rewards.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1463, 1465 (1864).
35. The “one-drop” rule was the legal conception that any cognizable fractional percentage of
black lineal descent defined an individual as being on the black side of the legal, social, and cultural
color lines, the corollary being that “purity” of a white bloodline was a requirement in order to qualify as white and obtain the benefits associated therewith. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1737 (1993).
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lation.36 Moreover, cases where courts have rejected litigants’ claims
based upon the badges and incidents of slavery theory of the Thirteenth
Amendment itself are legion,37 while cases accepting that theory are few
and far between.38 The track record regarding assertions that nonracial
subordination amounts to a badge or incident of slavery is equally dismal. Research for this Article reveals exactly one federal statute since
Reconstruction enacted pursuant to Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment
power to proscribe the badges and incidents of slavery as to nonracial
classes,39 no cases where litigants have actually succeeded in pressing
36. During Reconstruction, Congress exercised its power under the Thirteenth Amendment’s
Enforcement Clause to enact several civil rights statutes prohibiting what Congress believed to be
badges or incidents of slavery. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (protecting the equal rights of all citizens to
make and enforce contracts), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (protecting equal rights to buy, sell and lease property), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing civil action for deprivation of rights), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1987–1991
(describing federal proceedings for enforcing civil rights) were all originally enacted as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (prohibiting peonage) was originally enacted
as part of the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 546. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (providing criminal
penalties and civil liability for conspiracies to violate civil rights) was originally enacted as part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13.
37. I am speaking here of cases alleging constitutional claims directly under Section 1 of the
Amendment, rather than under a statute enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Amendment whereby
Congress has defined the complained-of injury as a badge or incident of slavery. For further discussion, see, for example, Carter, supra note 11, at 1339–55.
38. Lower court cases rejecting badges and incidents of slavery claims include NAACP v.
Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1989); Washington
v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1981); Alma Soc’y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979);
Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Keithly v. Univ. of Tex.
Sw. Med. Ctr., 2003 WL 22862798, No. Civ.A. 303CV0452L (N.D. Tex., Nov. 18, 2003); Crenshaw
v. City of Defuniak Springs, 891 F. Supp. 1548, 1556 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Sanders v. A.J. Canfield Co.,
635 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Atta v. Sun Co., 596 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Davidson v.
Yeshiva Univ., 555 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Lopez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1980). Indeed, at least
two courts have found that asserting that the Thirteenth Amendment provides a direct cause of action
for the badges or incidents of slavery is so fanciful as to be frivolous under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Adams, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 426; Sanders, 635 F. Supp. at 87. The only
case that (admittedly noncomprehensive) research for this Article revealed wherein a court has accepted such a badges and incidents of slavery claim is Vann v. Kempthorne, 467 F. Supp. 2d 56
(D.D.C. 2006). The court there found that a Thirteenth Amendment claim could be brought against
the Cherokee Nation, notwithstanding its sovereign immunity. Id. at 67. Even Vann, however, is at
least implicitly based upon the overlay of congressional approval for allowing the badges and incidents of slavery claim to proceed, rather than acceptance that the self-executing core of Section 1
itself provides redress for the badges and incidents of slavery. In Vann, the court found that Congress, in enacting the Treaty of 1866, “incorporated the principles of the Thirteenth Amendment and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866” into the Treaty and thereby made Thirteenth Amendment rights (including the right to be free from the badges and incidents of slavery) applicable to the Cherokee
Nation. Id. at 68. Moreover, the district court’s holding that the treaty abrogated the tribe’s sovereign
immunity was reversed on appeal. Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (leaving
undisturbed, however, the finding that the Thirteenth Amendment claim (and other claims) could
proceed against individual tribal officers, notwithstanding the immunity of the tribe as sovereign).
39. Since Reconstruction, the only federal statute this author can identify as being based explicitly upon Congress’s power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment is the Matthew Shep-
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claims that the Thirteenth Amendment itself provides a remedy for nonracial discrimination, and only one Supreme Court case that even examines in passing (in brief dictum) whether the badges and incidents of
slavery encompasses class-based discrimination.40
The near-total absence of federal legislation addressing nonracial
discrimination under the Thirteenth Amendment together with litigants’
lack of success in pressing such claims, is not, of course, conclusive
proof that the Thirteenth Amendment cannot be fairly interpreted to prohibit class-based subordination. The absence of developments in this direction in the case law and the legislative process does indicate, however,
that neither the courts nor Congress are currently likely to embrace the
Amendment as applicable to class-based subordination. I have long been
skeptical that, as a practical matter, courts would embrace such a theory.41 That skepticism has only increased over time, given that constitutional equality doctrine has generally grown only more cabined and
cramped as time has progressed.
Moreover, it is fair to say that the Thirteenth Amendment’s selfexecuting applicability remains less than completely secure, even in its
applicability to race-based injuries clearly linked to slavery.42 Indeed,
recent federal hate crimes legislation wherein Congress has explicitly
exercised its Section 2 power to define a condition as a badge or incident
of slavery is now being questioned in light of recent Supreme Court decisions limiting the scope of Congress’s power to enforce the other Reconstruction Amendments.43 My overarching point is that I am cautious
ard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111–84, div. E., § 4702(7), 123
Stat. 2190, 2835 (2009) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012)), which, inter alia, extended federal hate
crimes law to cover attacks based upon sexual orientation.
40. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Court held that a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (2012), originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and based upon the
Thirteenth Amendment, requires proof of “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added). The emphasized portion is dictum because Griffin itself involved racial discrimination, not “class.” In any
event, the Court’s brief statement is far too conditional and undefined to present the basis for a robust theory of the discrimination based on social class as a badge or incident of slavery.
41. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1355–65.
42. Despite the voluminous evidence of original intent that the Amendment would end both
slavery and its concomitant vestiges, the Supreme Court has never directly held that the Thirteenth
Amendment itself provides a cause of action to address the badges and incidents of slavery (although
it noted in Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 (1985), that Congress’s power to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment “is not inconsistent with the view that the Amendment has self-executing
force,” and in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968), specifically left open the
question of “[w]hether or not the Amendment itself did any more than [abolish slavery].”).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting defendants’
challenge to the constitutionality of the James L. Byrd and Matthew Shephard Hate Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 249 (2012), which relied in part upon the Thirteenth Amendment to expand the scope of
federal hate crimes law).
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about seeking further doctrinal extensions that may weaken the foundational badges and incidents of slavery doctrine by moving too far too
fast, and I am also skeptical in any event that such extensions would be
judicially embraced without prior step-by-step evolution of the doctrine.
II. CLASS AS CASTE: THE PERSISTENT EFFECTS OF MASS
INCARCERATION
I have previously advocated for an interpretive approach that would
define the scope of the badges and incidents of slavery theory with reference to two touchstones: (1) the connection the group to which the plaintiff belongs or that Congress seeks to protect has to the institution of
chattel slavery; and (2) the connection the complained of injury or proscribed condition has to the institution of chattel slavery.44 Cases in
which those two touchstones overlap completely would be the clearest
example of a condition amounting to a legacy of the system of slavery.
Where they do not overlap completely, I have argued that as the connection of the plaintiff (or the protected class) to the legacy of slavery grows
weaker, the connection that the complained-of injury has to the system of
slavery must grow correspondingly stronger in order for the claim or
statute to be within the badges and incidents of slavery power.
Notwithstanding my skepticism about the Thirteenth Amendment
as a remedy for generalized class discrimination, one example where applying the framework above may lead to the conclusion that a classbased distinction amounts to a badge or incident of slavery involves the
most severe and persistent effects of mass incarceration. The thesis is
straightforward: racialized policies giving rise to mass incarceration result in a permanent caste distinction of such magnitude and impermeability as to arguably amount to a badge or incident of slavery. Many of the
Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers specifically argued that the Amendment would forbid the permanent subordination under color of law of a
despised and identifiable group.45 It is, of course, true that the specific
44. Carter, supra note 11, at 1366–78.
45. For example, Senator Trumbull of Illinois, one of the Senate’s primary champions of the
Thirteenth Amendment, stated the debates regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (enacted pursuant
to the Thirteenth Amendment):
With the destruction of slavery necessarily follows the destruction of the incidents to
slavery.
Those laws that prevented the colored man from going from home, that did not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that did not allow him to own property;
that did not allow him to enforce rights; that did not allow him to be educated, were all
badges of servitude made in the interest of slavery and as a part of slavery. They never
would have been thought of or enacted anywhere but for slavery, and when slavery falls
they fall also.
....
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groups they were concerned with were the freedmen and free blacks, but
the reasoning is instructive. As noted in Part II.A, supra, the Framers
understood the system of slavery as involving more than uncompensated
labor. Rather, while slavery worked its most brutal and direct effects upon those actually enslaved, the all-encompassing Slave Power was seen
as having perverted the country as a whole. One aspect of the Slave
Power was that it legalized white supremacy and demonized nonwhiteness. Thus, nonslave blacks suffered the same civil disabilities in
the slaveholding states (and many non-slaveholding states) as blacks who
were actually enslaved. Moreover, the line between slave and nonslave
status for blacks was as simple as crossing a state line into a slaveholding
state. Phrased differently, then, all members of a group sharing a common immutable characteristic (i.e., African descent) were bounded within the same category: subject to enslavement and subject to the same civil disabilities. It was this feature and function of the Slave Power that the
Thirteenth Amendment found philosophically objectionable and inconsistent with American democracy: the use of a single trait or status
(race/non-whiteness) as permanently defining one’s status before the law
for all time, with no possibility of redemption as a member of civil society.46
The persistent effects of mass incarceration create a large, racialized, near-permanent underclass unable to overcome its alienation from
civil society. In short, racialized legislation, law enforcement actions,
and prosecutorial policies have led to massive racial disparities in those
incarcerated. The status of having been incarcerated results in alienation
from civil society in a wide variety of circumstances. Felony disenfranchisement laws render persons affected by the laws and policies leading
to mass incarceration unable to directly influence the very law and policies at issue. The extreme difficulty of securing legitimate employment
as an ex-offender due to many employers’ policies against hiring exoffenders incentivizes some ex-offenders to commit sustenance crimes
I have no doubt that under [the Thirteenth Amendment] we may destroy all these
discriminations in civil rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional
amendment amounts to nothing.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 321, 322 (1866).
46. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers argued that nothing but innate ability and hard work
should represent a ceiling to human worth and achievement, at least in the eyes of the law. For example, during the Thirteenth Amendment debates, Representative Wilson of Iowa characterized the
founding American principle as follows: “[T]he new [American] Republic . . . proclaimed in the ear
of all humanity that the poor, the humble, the sons of toil, whose hands were hardened by honest
labor, whose limbs were chilled by the blasts of winter, whose cheeks were scorched by the suns of
summer, were the peers, the equals, before the law, of kings and princes and nobles . . . .” CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1319 (1864). The most famous living example of this ethos among the
Framing generation was, of course, President Lincoln’s rise from humble origins.
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(e.g., shoplifting and petty theft) or drug-trafficking crimes (because the
underground drug economy is in many neighborhoods the most readilyavailable source of income), leading to their reincarceration. For those
who avoid participation in the underground economy, the absence of
available legitimate work often renders them unable to pay the panoply
of fines levied repeatedly and disproportionately upon persons of color
(as recently documented in Ferguson, Missouri47 and elsewhere), and the
inability to pay such fines often results in reincarceration and their further alienation from civil society. Thus, the racialized caste boundary
created and reinforced by the carceral state remains permanent.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that generalized class-based discrimination
is unlikely to be found to be a badge or incident of slavery. Nonetheless,
there may be particularized instances of status discrimination that are tied
sufficiently closely to the legacy of slavery and to the Framers’ expressed intentions in adopting the Thirteenth Amendment that they may
well be within the Amendment’s scope. Expanding the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment’s proscription of the badges and incidents of
slavery is most likely to be successful via modest, step-by-step, doctrinal
evolution.

47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2015),
available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.

